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Arizona Gamete Donor Law:  
A Call for Recognizing Women’s  
Asymmetrical Property Interest in Pre-Embryo 
Disposition Disputes 
By Melissa B. Herrera* 
Sperm may be cheap and plentiful, eggs are not. 
—Ruth Colker1 
It is a disturbing consequence of modern biological technology that the fate 
of nascent human life, which the Embryos in this case represent, must be 
determined in a court by reference to cold legal principles. 
—Hon. Judge Anne-Christine Massullo2 
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Arizona residents, Ruby Torres and John Joseph Terrell first met in 
2003 and began dating on and off in 2009.3 In June of 2014, at the age of 
thirty-three years old, Ruby was diagnosed with triple negative bilateral 
breast cancer, which is one of the most aggressive forms of cancer.4 Her 
treatment plan included chemotherapy, radiation, and a bilateral 
mastectomy.5 Ruby was advised that her treatment plan would place her 
body in menopause, rendering her virtually unable to have biological 
children.6 
With only a month to start treatment, Ruby decided to undergo the 
process of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) in an effort to preserve her ability to 
have future children.7 The couple hastily began the IVF treatment process 
and wed in July of 2014.8 The treatment resulted in the extraction of 
fourteen eggs, which were then fertilized with John’s sperm.9 Seven pre-
embryos were produced and cryogenically10 preserved for future use.11 The 
couple stated that they intended to have children down the line—
presumably when Ruby’s health was stabilized.12  
 
 3. Appellants Opening Brief, In re the Matter of John Joseph Terrell v. Ruby Torres, 
No. CA-CV 17-0617, 2017 WL 6663727, at *3 (Ariz. App. Div. 1) [hereinafter referred to 
as Terrell v. Torres]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 5.  
 8. Id. at 3-5. 
 9. Id. at 7. 
 10. See Cryopreservation and Storage, AMER. SOC’Y REPROD. MED., (last visited Apr. 
12, 2018), http://www.asrm.org/topics/topics-index/cryopreservation-and-storage/ 
[https://per ma.cc/F8G4-6K97] (defines Cryopreservation as the freezing of embryos, eggs, 
or sperm at very low temperature to preserve viability). 
 11. Terrell v. Torres, supra note 3, at *7; see generally Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 
588, 593 (Tenn. 1992) (explaining the term “pre-embryo” as referring to the initial phase of 
human development, beginning with the first cell division, continuing up to fourteen days 
after conception). For the sake of consistency, the term “pre-embryo” will be used to refer to 
this stage of development. The terms “embryo” and “pre-embryo” have been used 
interchangeably throughout this note. 
 12. Ken Alltucker, Woman Battling Cancer, Ex-husband Ordered to Donate Fertilized 
Embryos, THE REPUBLIC, (Aug. 31, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/ 
nation-now/2017/08/31/woman-battling-cancer-ex-husband-ordered-donate-fertilized-embry 
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Ruby’s aggressive cancer treatment plan was successful, and her cancer 
is in remission.13 Sadly, Ruby and John’s marriage did not survive.  John 
initiated dissolution proceedings in August of 2016.14 Like many other 
women in her position, Ruby is now facing an uphill legal battle to be 
awarded the right to the embryos, which may be her only opportunity to 
have biological children.15 
The disposition of Ruby and John’s pre-embryo’s presented Arizona 
courts with a case of first impression. At the time of the trial court hearing, 
Arizona did not have a statute to address this burgeoning predicament.16 On 
August 21, 2017, Honorable Judge Ronee F. Korbin Steiner determined 
that the frozen embryos were jointly owned and per their previous 
agreement, were to be donated to a third party or couple for the purpose of 
impregnation.17 Ruby has appealed this decision and the case is currently 
pending in the Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.18 
Without a uniform federal regulation regarding the disposition of pre-
embryos in dissolution proceedings, some state legislatures have enacted 
legislation to mitigate potential issues for parties; each state varying in their 
approaches.19 Inspired by Ruby’s harrowing story, Arizona is the latest 
state to enact a statute regarding the disposition of embryos in a dissolution 
proceeding—Senate Bill SB 1393.20 This bill was first presented to the 
Arizona Senate by Republican members in late January of 2018 and was 
 
os/623100001/ [https://perma.cc/84MU-4BQR]. 
 13. Ken Alltucker, Cancer Survivor Battling Ex-husband Ordered to Donate Fertilized 
Embryos, THE REPUBLIC, (Sept. 1, 2017, 6:31 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news 
/local/arizona-health/2017/08/31/cancer-battling-arizona-woman-ex-husband-ordered-dona 
te-fertilized-embryos/617118001/ [https://perma.cc/6B5Z-W9UD]. 
 14. Ken Alltucker, Phoenix Cancer Survivor to Appeal Judge’s Order to Donate her 
Embryos, THE REPUBLIC (Sept. 19, 2017, 5:45 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/ 
local/phoenix/2017/09/19/phoenix-cancer-survivor-appeal-judges-order-donate-her-embry 
os/682738001/ [https://perma.cc/XL6D-H2AD]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Alltucker, supra note 12; Terrell v. Torres, supra note 3, at *4. 
 17. Terrell v. Torres, supra note 3, at *1. 
 18. Court Docket at 1, Terrell v. Torres, No. 1 CA-CV 17-0617 FC, 2018 Ct. of App., 
Div. 1* (2017), (last visited Nov. 12. 2018), https://apps.supremecourt.az.gov/aacc/appella/ 
1CA/CV/CV170617.pdf [https://perma.cc/REW6-VLCJ] (This case is still pending, the 
current case status per the docket states that this case has been under advisement since June 
13, 2018).  
 19. Andy Newman, California Judge Orders Frozen Embryos Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/us/california-judge-orders-frozen-
embryos-destroyed.html [https://perma.cc/68XY-NA44]; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-133 
(West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN §24-9A-1(D) (West 
2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 111L, § 4 (West 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-20-
64 (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106 (West 2018); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
160.706 (West 2017); 2018 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 6 (S.S.B. 6037) (West 2018). 
 20. SB 1393: Parental Right to Embryo, CTR. ARIZ. POL’Y (last visited Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.azpolicy.org/bill/sb-1393-parental-right-to-embryo/ [https://perma.cc/X722-
72C4]. 
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adopted into law on April 3, 2018.21 It was introduced as an effort to 
protect a prospective parent’s right to his or her embryos. Commenters 
have noted that this bill seeks to “balance the interests of the spouses by 
removing any right, obligation, or interest between the spouse that no 
longer wants to be a parent and any resulting child.”22 Pursuant to this new 
law, the person who wants the embryos for the purpose of bringing them to 
life will be awarded the embryos.23 This law makes it so that someone in 
Ruby’s situation will not suffer her same fate. But is this the correct 
solution? This Note argues that in many ways, the newly enacted Arizona 
statute will generally yield the “right” outcome, but it is not the best means 
to achieve it.  
Section I of this note describes both the process of IVF as well as the 
legal background. I begin to advance the assertion that the current legal 
framework is flawed, and propose that states adopt a woman-centered 
approach to embryo disputes24 in which women presumptively win. One of 
the controlling factors in this analysis is the gamete provider’s inability to 
produce additional gametes. In the seminal case regarding embryo disputes, 
Davis v. Davis, the court stated, “as they stand on the brink of potential 
parenthood, Mary Sue Davis and Junior Lewis Davis must be seen as 
entirely equivalent gamete-providers.”25 In doing so, the court set up a 
framework—that was followed thereafter—where the contributions to the 
IVF process by both sexes are presumed to be the same. The reality is that 
the biological differences between men and women make it so that 
women’s contributions are not only physically greater, as the egg is the 
largest cell in the body,26 but the process itself is much more invasive and 
physically taxing on women. Women should have a greater claim to pre-
embryos because they have greater “sweat equity”27 invested in the embryo 
itself. Though it is true that the potential for human life exists because of 
 
 21. Bill History for SB1393, ARIZ. STAT. LEG., (last visited Apr. 12, 2018), https://apps. 
azleg.gov/BillStatus/BillOverview/70559?SessionId=119 [https://perma.cc/28AG-S6PE]. 
 22. CTR. ARIZ. POL’Y, supra note 20. 
 23. Id. 
 24. The phrase “embryo disputes” referes to disputes that may arrise in dissolution or 
seperation.  
 25. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992). 
 26. Egg Freezing FAQ, USC FERTILITY, (last visited Apr. 12, 2018), http://uscfertilit 
y.org/egg-freezing-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/LN2N-UJYK].  
 27. The term “sweat equity” refers to “the effort and toil a company’s owners and 
employees contribute to a project or enterprise …” Will Kenton, Sweat Equity, 
INVESTOPEDIA, (June 25, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sweatequity.asp 
[https://perma.cc/9Q29-SKAB]. This term is used in business to describe a compensation 
structure seen in start-up companies. Id. It is also used in reference to real estate, property. 
Id. Here, sweat equity refers to the additional ways in which women contribute to IVF that 
men do not. For example, during the IVF process, women must endure hormonal treatment 
and undergo an invasive procedure for doctor’s to extract their eggs for later implantation—
men do not.  
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both gamete providers, this should not be taken to mean that both 
contributions are equivalent.  
Moreover, Davis set the stage to view a prior written agreement on the 
disposition of the embryos as evidence of the parties’ intent.28 However, 
given the nature of the matter—two married people coming together and 
deciding to expand their family—there is no incentive or wherewithal to 
bargain over equitable terms if the relationship ends. Thus, the contract 
approach followed by many states whereby courts uphold and presume 
written agreements to be valid is also flawed and inequitable at the outset.  
Shifting focus, section II examines Arizona’s newly adopted Arizona 
Revised Statute section 25-318.03. Next, I contrast the case that was the 
impetus for the Arizona bill, In re the Matter of John Joseph Terrell v. 
Ruby Torres, to the factually similar case adjudicated in California, Findley 
v. Lee. I conclude this section by proposing that courts can arrive at the 
same outcome as Revised Statute section 25-318.03—awarding the embryo 
to the party who is most likely to bring it to life29—by rightfully weighing a 
woman’s30 greater contribution in the creation of the embryo more heavily 
that of her husband’s.31  
Section III explores the constitutionality of Arizona Revised Statute 
section 25-318.03 and discusses the possibility of a right to IVF located 
within the right to procreate. This step is necessary in order to determine if 
states can create statutes regulating IVF. Moreover, analyzing the right to 
procreate is also important to establishing whether a woman-centered 
approach is viable. I then discuss how courts should position embryos 
within the legal framework of property or in the alternative, in the form of 
special property or sui generis—but not as people. Embryos are a special 
form of property because of their potential for human life, but they are 
property nonetheless. Imputing personhood on a collection of cells that 
may never be a person is problematic to women and reproductive rights.  I 
conclude my analysis by proposing a modest federal regulation where the 
federal government enacts a statute declaring frozen embryos as a special 
 
 28. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 597. 
 29. For the purposes of this argument, the author assumes that more often than not, 
women will be awarded any and all pre-embryos in dissolution proceedings under this new 
statute. This assumption is rooted in both biological realities and conventional gender 
norms. As such, a woman’s centered approach that guides the ajudication of embryo 
disputes would yeild the same outcome. Given that Arizona Revised Statute section 25-
318.03 is newly enacted, there is no data avalable at this time that either proves or disproves 
this assumption. The author acknowledges that the statute creates the opportunity for a 
husband to be awarded any and all embryos against the wishes of is wife. Moreover, the 
statute is also applicable in non-heteronormative couplings.  
 30. References to women in this essay refer to cis-gendered women. The author 
acknowledges that the analysis would be different for trans and gender nonconforming 
individuals.  
 31. The argument presented does not undertake the different, albeit related, legal issues 
that arise as a result of divorce or separation in non-heteronormative relationships.  
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type of property. This could bring uniformity to embryo disposition 
disputes and assist in ensuring that reproductive rights do not vary by 
jurisdiction.  
Women have a disproportionate property investment in the embryo due 
to biology, sweat equity, and the overall invasive nature of the IVF process 
on women’s bodies. This disproportionate property interest should not be 
discounted by equating it to men’s contribution—doing so is not only a 
miscarriage of justice, but also a reaffirmation of patriarchal norms.  
I. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: THE MEDICAL PROCEDURE AND 
THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A. THE PROCESS OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 
“In vitro fertilization (“IVF”) is a complex series of procedures used to 
treat fertility or genetic problems and assist with the conception of a 
child.”32 It is the most common and effective form of assisted reproductive 
technology (“ART”).33 IVF technology has been used by medical 
professionals since the late 1970s.34 In 1978, in Britain, Louise Brown 
became the first person born through IVF.35 It is estimated that over 5 
million babies have been born through IVF worldwide.36 The U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services estimates that there may be as 
many as 620,000 cryo-preserved embryos in the United States.37 The 
average cost of one IVF cycle is between $10,000 and $15,000.38 
The steps involved in IVF are as follows: ovulation induction, egg 
retrieval, sperm retrieval, fertilization and embryo transfer.39 During a 
typical IVF procedure, mature eggs are retrieved from the woman’s ovaries 
and fertilized by sperm in a laboratory.40 The fertilized egg, also known as 
 
 32. In vitro Fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC, (last visited Apr. 12, 2018), https:// 
www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac-20384716 
[https://perma.cc/ H4UN-CGDA]. 
 33. Assisted Reproductive Technology, MEDLINE PLUS, (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) 
https://medlineplus.gov/assistedreproductivetechnology.html [https://perma.cc/AK8N-T8VC]. 
 34. MAYO CLINIC, supra note 32. 
 35. Maggie Fox, A Million Babies Have Been Born in the U.S. With Fertility Help, 
NBC NEWS, (Apr. 28, 2017 9:08 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/mil 
lion-babies-have-been-born-u-s-fertility-help-n752506 [https://perma.cc/YB7V-7EWF]. 
 36. Bonnie Rochman, 5 Million Babies Born Through IVF in the Last 35 Years, NBC 
NEWS, (Oct. 14, 2013, 4:54 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/healthmain/5-million-babies-
born-through-ivf-past-35-years-researchers-8C11390532 [https://perma.cc/8SWN-WPH9]. 
 37. Embryo Adoption, U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, (last visited Apr. 12, 
2018), https://www.hhs.gov/opa/about-opa/embryo-adoption/index.html [https://perma.cc/9 
CQS-6274]. 
 38. Frequently Asked Questions, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., (last visited Apr. 
12, 2018), http://www.sart.org/patients/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/49UT-
2S7D]. 
 39. MAYO CLINIC, supra note 32. 
 40. Id. 
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an embryo, is then implanted in the patient’s uterus or cryogenically 
preserved.41 Cryopreservation refers to the freezing of embryos, eggs, or 
sperm at a very low temperature to preserve viability.42 Liquid nitrogen is 
typically used to achieve the necessary temperature.43 
Although eggs and sperm may be frozen separately, embryos have a 
higher success rate for eventual live birth.44 “The egg is the largest cell in 
the human body and contains a large amount of water.”45 Because of these 
properties, when eggs are frozen, ice crystals form that can destroy the 
cell.46 However, crystal formation can be prevented through a technique 
that involves dehydrating the egg and replacing the water with an “anti-
freeze” prior to cryopreservation.47 This is important to preserve the 
integrity of the frozen egg or embryo.48 Additionally, researchers can 
fertilize an egg with a hardened shell by injecting the sperm into the egg 
with a needle by using a technique known as intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection (“ICSI”).49 These procedures assist in protecting the viability and 
stability of the pre-embryo. 
B. LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF PRE-EMBRYO DISPUTES—PERSON, PROPERTY, 
OR SUI GENERIS? 
Currently, there is no federal statute or regulation that governs the 
disposition of frozen embryos.50 Some state legislatures have enacted 
statutes regarding this subject matter, but the type of statute varies 
geographically. For example, Louisiana has statutorily imputed personhood 
to in vitro fertilized human cells and human genetic material by bestowing 
these embryos with rights, such as the right to sue or be sued.51 Louisiana’s 
revised statute title 9 section 126 states that “the in vitro fertilized human 
ovum is a biological human being which is not the property of the 
physician which acts as an agent of fertilization, or the facility which 
 
 41. USC FERTILITY, supra note 26.  
 42. Cryopreservation and Storage, AMER. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., (last visited Apr. 
12, 2018), http://www.asrm.org/topics/topics-index/cryopreservation-and-storage/ [https:// 
perma.cc/7LFG-FMJP]. 
 43. AMER. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 42. 
 44. Robin Marantz Henig, Freezing Eggs May Reduce a Woman’s Odds of Success 
with IVF, HEALTH NEWS FROM NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Aug. 28, 2015, 12:06 PM), https://ww 
w.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/08/28/435251307/freezing-eggs-may-reduce-a-wom 
ans-odds-of-success-with-ivf [https://perma.cc/Z6P6-698E]. 
 45. USC FERTILITY, supra note 26.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Findley, supra note 2, at 1. 
 51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (West 2018); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:124 (West 
2018).  
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employs him or the donors of the sperm and ovum.”52 In Louisiana, viable 
in vitro fertilized human embryos are juridical people and, as such, they 
may not be destroyed.53 In the event of a dispute over the disposition of the 
embryo, “the judicial standard for resolving such disputes is . . . the best 
interest” of the pre-embryo, which is the standard used in child custody 
disputes.54 If parties choose not to implant the embryo, then that embryo is 
to be made available for adoptive implantation.55 
In California, Health & Safety Code section 125315 regulates the 
nature of information that physicians are required to give patients 
undergoing fertility treatments.56 The statute also proscribes a required set 
of options that the patient must decide upon and set forth in an advance 
directive prior to treatment.57 For example, patients must decide on the 
disposition of the embryos in the event of death or marriage.58 Unlike 
Louisiana, California takes a hybrid property and contractual approach to 
the disposition of an embryo. Other states have enacted models similar to 
the one in California. In New Jersey and Massachusetts, for example, 
physicians are also required to obtain informed and voluntary consent from 
the gamete donors with regard to the disposition of the embryos.59 
States typically adjudicate embryo disputes by using one of three 
analytical frameworks: “1) the contractual approach; 2) the balancing 
approach; and 3) the contemporaneous mutual consent approach.”60 Courts 
have been reluctant to grant “one party an embryo to initiate pregnancy 
over the objection of the other gamete” provider.61 Absent agreement, the 
default is a balancing of interests’ test.62 
The first case where a court provided guidance on the disposition of 
embryos in a dissolution proceeding, absent an agreement, is the seminal 
case from the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Davis v. Davis.63 Junior Lewis 
Davis and Mary Sue Davis met in spring of 1979 while in the Army and 
stationed in Germany.64 The couple married soon after on April 26, 1980.65 
 
 52. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (West 2018). 
 53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2018). 
 54. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:131 (West 2018). 
 55. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (West 2018). 
 56. CA. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §125315 (West 2018). 
 57. Id § 125315(b). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 111L, § 4 (West 2018); N.J STAT. ANN. §26:2Z-2 
(amended 2018).  
 60. Findley, supra note 2, at 15. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 604. 
 63. Id. at 604. 
 64. Id. at 591. 
 65. Id. 
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Mary Sue became pregnant shortly after.66 Unfortunately, she was unable 
to carry this pregnancy to term due to a tubal pregnancy, which not only 
caused a miscarriage but ultimately resulted in the removal of her right 
fallopian tube.67 Sadly, this was the beginning of their issues with 
conception. Mary Sue went on to have four more tubal pregnancies that 
ultimately left her without functioning fallopian tubes.68 As such, IVF 
became their only option to have biological children.69 
Beginning in 1985, the couple went through a total of six attempts at 
IVF.70 None of the treatments resulted in a pregnancy.71 Believing that their 
marriage would stand the test of time, the couple did not have a prior 
agreement on the disposition of the embryos. However, Junior Lewis Davis 
filed for divorce in February 1989 after a transfer procedure did not result 
in pregnancy.72 Junior Lewis and Mary Sue agreed on all other aspects of 
their divorce except the disposition of the frozen embryos.73 Initially, Mary 
Sue wanted the trial court to award her ownership so that she could use 
them in another pregnancy attempt after the divorce.74 However, as the 
litigation progressed, and she remarried, Mary Sue changed her position 
and wanted ownership over the embryos so that she could donate them to 
an infertile couple—an action that she believed would provide meaning to 
the years of invasive procedures that she underwent in her arduous attempts 
to conceive.75 
The Davis court, outlined several approaches for courts to use in 
similar cases.76 The Tennessee Supreme Court held that disputes involving 
the disposition of pre-embryos should be resolved by first looking to the 
preferences of the progenitors.77 If this is not feasible, then the court should 
look to any prior agreement concerning the disposition.78 If no prior 
agreement exists, then the court should balance the interests of the parties 
in using or not using the pre-embryo.79 The court took the position that the 
embryos belonged in an interim category between property and people.80 In 
doing so, the court established that embryos are sui generis—a category “of 
 
 66. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 591. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 592. 
 73. Id. at 589. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 604. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 597. 
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its own kind.” They reasoned that the embryos were not property because 
they had the potential for human life, but this potential for human life did 
not automatically confer personhood.81 The court also held that since Mary 
Sue no longer wanted to use the embryos for her own use, Lewis’ “right” 
not to procreate outweighed Mary Sue’s interest in wanting the embryos to 
be donated to an infertile couple to give her fertility efforts meaning.82 
A major issue with the current framework is inconsistency, which in 
turn propagates a piecemeal system where reproductive rights vary from 
state to state. For example, in Louisiana, as previously mentioned, an 
embryo has personhood and it cannot be disposed of—ever. Thus, in 
Louisiana, the option of freezing embryos will lead to the forfeiture of your 
cells, your genetic material, and potentially your only chance at future 
pregnancy if you choose not to or are unable to use your embryos yourself. 
In contrast, in California, there is arguably more reproductive freedom for 
women because there are more choices available to them. Embryos are not 
forcibly donated unless a prior agreement contains an advanced written 
directive requiring forcible donation. California’s approach reflects the 
holding and rationale from Davis in which embryos are treated as a form of 
special property whose fate can be decided similarly to other forms of high-
stakes property. Inconsistency among jurisdictions regarding the 
disposition of embryos has the potential to be discriminatory against 
women and should be eradicated.  
II. COMPARING MODELS ON EMBRYO DISPUTES:  
ARIZONA AND CALIFORNIA 
A. THE HARROWING CASE OF JOHN J. TERRELL V. RUBY TORRES  
Ruby Torres’ life was going according to plan. Prioritizing education, 
Ruby first graduated from Arizona State University with a Bachelor of 
Science in 2002.83 After her undergraduate degree, Ruby earned both a 
Masters of Education and a Juris Doctorate.84 Ruby has worked as an 
attorney in the areas of wrongful death, litigation, and personal injury.85  
Ruby met John Joseph Terrell, her now ex-husband, in 2003 and began 
an on-again-off-again relationship in 2009.86 Ruby’s life and the couple’s 
relationship was forever altered after Ruby discovered a lump on her breast 
during a self-examination.87 In July of 2014, thirty-three-year-old Ruby 
 
 81. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 597. 
 82. Id. at 604. 
 83. Ruby Torres, LINKEDIN (last visited Apr. 2018), https://www.linkedin.com/in/ruby-
torres-6804475b [http://perma.cc/2YW7-A4TY]. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Ruby Torres, AVVO (last visited Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.avvo.com/attorneys/ 
850 05-az-ruby-torres-4514406.html [http://perma.cc/B548-5F29]. 
 86. Terrell v. Torres, supra note 3, at *3. 
 87. Alltucker, supra note 12. 
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Torres, attorney at law, was diagnosed with one of the most aggressive and 
difficult types of cancer to treat,88 bilateral triple negative breast cancer.89 
After delivering the prognosis, Ruby’s oncologist referred her to a fertility 
treatment center to preserve her ability to have children in the future.90 
After treatment, this form of cancer would leave Ruby with no other 
opportunity to have biological children.91 Acting on the advice of her 
oncologist, Ruby took “steps to preserve her ability to have children in the 
future.”92 Ruby consulted with reproductive endocrinologist, Dr. Millie 
Behera, M.D. at the Bloom Institute.93 “After her consultation, Ruby 
decided to preserve her fertility in light of the upcoming chemotherapy and 
cancer treatment by way of in vitro fertilization.”94 
Initially, Ruby’s then boyfriend, John, was reluctant to participate in 
the IVF procedure but had a change of heart when he learned Ruby had 
another possible sperm donor.95 With only a month before having to begin 
aggressive cancer treatment, Ruby and John entered into a contract for the 
IVF procedure on July 11, 2014.96 The contract had a provision for the 
disposition of the embryos in the event of a divorce or dissolution of 
relationship.97Their agreement provides in pertinent part that:  
 
In the event the patient and her spouse are divorced . . . we 
agree that the embryos should be disposed of in the 
following manner (check one box only): A court decree 
and/or settlement agreement will be presented to the Clinic 
directing use to achieve a pregnancy in one of us or 
donation to another couple for that purpose.98 
 
The couple was presented with a second option, to destroy any unused 
embryos in the event of a dissolution.99 This option was rejected by the 
couple.100 
After executing the contract, the record shows that Ruby underwent the 
 
 88. Triple Negative Breast Cancer, NAT’L BREAST CANCER FOUND., INC., (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2018), http://www.nationalbreastcancer.org/triple-negative-breast-cancer [http://per 
ma.cc/SCZ2-C8H5]. 
 89. Alltucker, supra note 13.  
 90. Terrell v. Torres, supra note 3, at *3-4. 
 91. Alltucker, supra note 13. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Terrell v. Torres, supra note 3, at *4. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at *4-5. 
 97. Id.at *5. 
 98. Id. at *5-6. 
 99. Id. at *6. 
 100. Id.  
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process of in vitro fertilization (IVF) to create embryos that could be 
implanted after her cancer treatment.101 Ruby endured a “three-week 
treatment course that resulted in fourteen eggs.”102 The treatment 
successfully produced seven pre-embryos.103 “The intent of creating these 
embryos was to have the right to have children down the road.”104  
Ruby had the option of having her eggs frozen for future fertilization 
but was advised against this option because the success rate for frozen 
embryos to develop into children is higher than that of frozen eggs that are 
later fertilized.105 “At the time of the execution of the contract, the couple 
had been together since 2009 and were not thinking that their relationship 
would come to an end.”106 It is evident that this fact played a crucial role in 
Ruby’s decision to have her eggs fertilized with John. The record 
demonstrates that had John not offered to donate his sperm, she would have 
acted on the advice of her care providers to best preserve her ability to have 
children in the future and would have opted to use another donor. This fact 
should be given substantial consideration when weighing Ruby’s interest in 
the embryos over John’s interest because if not for his willingness to 
donate his sperm, she would have exclusive possession of the embryos 
created with her eggs.  
After the IVF treatment, Ruby underwent both chemotherapy and 
radiation treatment to eradicate her cancer and save her life.107 The 
treatments were successful, and Ruby is currently in remission.108 
Unfortunately, as many marriages do, Ruby and John’s marriage came to 
an end.109 John initiated divorce proceedings in 2016.110 As is the case with 
many divorce proceedings, the court was left with dividing all the couple’s 
assets. However, this Arizona court also had the Solomon-like task of 
deciding the disposition of the couple’s seven frozen embryos that are 
stored at a fertility bank.111 Who gets the embryos? Without any state 
precedent or statute to follow as a guide, the Maricopa County trial court 
judge ruled that neither party would get the embryos.112 Instead, the judge 
 
 101. Jason Berry, Bitter Divorce Highlighted by Fight over Embryo, AZ FAMILY (Sept. 
1, 2017, 5:45 PM), http://www.azfamily.com/story/36275322/bitter-divorce-highlighted-by-
fight-over-frozen-embryos [http://perma.cc/3BWL-BM7S]. 
 102. Terrell v. Torres, supra note 3, at *7. 
 103. Alltucker, supra note 13. 
 104. Alltucker, supra note 12 (quoting an interview with the Arizona Republic 
newspaper). 
 105. Terrell v. Torres, supra note 3, at *7. 
 106. Berry, supra note 99. 
 107. Alltucker, supra note 13. 
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ordered the embryos be donated to a third party because Ruby and John 
were unable to reach an agreement.113 The presiding judge stated that 
John’s “right not to be compelled to be a parent outweighs [his] wife’s 
rights to procreate and desire to have a biologically related child.”114 
Ruby no longer produces eggs following the chemotherapy and any 
efforts to produce viable eggs are unlikely to be successful.115 Now, her 
only opportunity to conceive a biological child may be lost forever. Ruby 
has appealed the ruling on the grounds that “the contract provided that the 
embryos are joint property of both parties, and based upon a balancing of 
interests’ test, the embryos should be awarded to her.116 This case is 
currently pending and under advisement in the Arizona Court of Appeals, 
Division 1 since the Honorable Samuel A. Thurma heard oral arguments on 
June 13, 2018.117 If the order is upheld, Ruby may never know the fate of 
her potential progeny. However, no matter what Honorable Thurma’s 
decision, this may not be the end of the line for this issue or this case. 
B. ENACTED ARIZONA SENATE BILL 1393—ARIZONA REVISED STATUTE 
SECTION 25-318.03 
Arizona Senate Bill SB 1393 was signed into law by Republican 
Governor Doug Ducey on April 8, 2018.118 This bill adds section 25-318.03 
to the state’s Marital and Domestic Relations statutes. Arizona Revised 
Statute section 25-318.03 concerns the disposition of embryos in a divorce 
proceeding.119 It also outlines the responsibilities of the parties.120 At the 
outset, the statute makes clear that Arizona’s general rule is to grant the 
embryo to the party who will develop it to birth. 121 The bill reads in 
pertinent part: 
 
If an action described in section 25-318, subsection A 
involves the disposition of in vitro human embryos, the 
court shall:  
1. Award the in vitro human embryos to the spouse who 
intends to allow the in vitro human embryos to develop to birth. 
 
 113. S.E. Smith, Proposed Arizona Law Could Promote Embryonic Personhood, CARE2 
(Feb 21, 2018), https://www.care2.com/causes/proposed-arizona-law-could-promote-embr 
yonic-personhood.html [http://perma.cc/CF85-ZD7A]. 
 114.Alltucker, supra note 13. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Appellate Terrell v. Torres supra note 18. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Christine Snavely, Breaking News: Gov. Ducey Signs CAP-Supported Bill SB 1393, 
CENR. ARIZ. POL’Y (Apr. 3, 2018), http://www.azpolicy.org/2018/04/03/breaking-news-gov-
ducey-signs-cap-supported-bill-sb-1393/ [http://perma.cc/Q4DQ-QCRG]. 
 119. S.1393, 53rd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (AZ. 2018). 
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2. If both spouses intend to allow the in vitro human 
embryos to develop to birth and both spouses provided 
their gametes for the in vitro human embryos, resolve any 
dispute on disposition of the in vitro human embryos in a 
manner that provides the best chance for the in vitro 
human embryos to develop to birth.  
3. If both spouses intend to allow the in vitro human 
embryos to develop to birth but only one spouse provided 
gametes for the in vitro human embryos, award the in vitro 
human embryos to the spouse that provided gametes for 
the in vitro human embryos. 122 
Moreover, section 25-318.03(B) goes as far as to declare that even in 
situations where parties have a prior agreement, the court should still award 
the embryo to the spouse who will bring the embryo to life.123 The 
subsections (C) and (D) of the statute make it clear that the spouse who is 
not awarded the embryo does not have responsibilities, rights, or 
obligations with respect to any child that may result, unless said party 
consents to such responsibilities.124 Subsections (E) orders the spouse who 
is not awarded the embryos to provide the spouse who was ordered the 
embryos with “detailed written nonidentifying information that includes the 
health and genetic history of the spouse and spouse’s family.”125 And 
finally, the last subsection of the statute provides definitions for relevant 
terms in the statute, specifically for “gamete,” “human embryo,” and “in 
vitro.”126 
C. CALIFORNIA: HEALTH & SAFETY CODE SECTION 125315 AND FINDLEY 
V. LEE  
California’s statute for the disposition of frozen embryos is not located 
in its Family Law Code, but rather in section 125315 of the Health and 
Safety Code.127 Health and Safety Code section 125315 has been in effect 
since 2004.128 It sets out detailed guidelines for the information that health 
care providers delivering the fertility treatment must provide their patients 
in order to satisfy the requirement of informed consent; and the options 
patients may choose from when deciding the disposition of embryos in 
 
 122. S.1393, 53rd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (AZ. 2018). 
 123. Id. 
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various situations.129 
Pursuant to California’s statute, individuals undergoing IVF must be 
provided with information regarding their options for unused embryos.130 
Moreover, patients must indicate “advanced written directives regarding 
the disposition of embryos.”131 The statute states that at a minimum, 
patients must decide the disposition of their embryos in the following 
circumstances: 1) death of either partner, 2) death of both partners or death 
of a patient without a partner, 3) separation or divorce of the partners, 4) 
the partners’ decision or patient’s decision who is without a partner, to 
abandon the embryos by request or a failure to pay storage fees.132 The 
statute enumerates different options the patient can choose from depending 
on the circumstance.133 
With regard to divorce or separation of partners, patients can choose to 
dispose of the embryos in one of six ways. The statute reads in pertinent 
part: 
In the event of separation or divorce of the partners, the embryos 
shall be disposed of by one of the following actions: 
(A) Made available to the female partner. 
(B) Made available to the male partner. 
(C) Donation for research purposes. 
(D) Thawed with no further action taken. 
(E) Donation to another couple or individual. 
(F) Other disposition that is clearly stated. 134 
 
California’s statutory scheme calls on the courts to take a contract approach 
to embryo disputes.  
In a case factually similar to that of Ruby Torres, Findley v. Lee, 
California courts upheld the parties’ prior agreement to thaw and discard 
unused embryos if the parties divorced or separated.135 Steven Findley and 
Mimi C. Lee first met during their undergraduate studies at Harvard 
College in 1988.136 Mimi later obtained a joint M.D./Ph.D. in neuroscience 
from the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York.137 Mimi went 
on to move to the West Coast and practice anesthesiology in the Bay 
Area.138 Steven “went on to work in finance and became a Senior Vice 
 
 129. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (West 2018). 
 130. Id.  
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 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Findley, supra note 2, at 2. 
 136. Id. at 3. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 4. 
ARIZONA GAMETE DONOR LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 1/22/2019  10:19 AM 
134 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:1] 
President and Senior Research Analyst at Alliance Bernstein, a global 
wealth management firm in New York.”139 The pair remained close friends 
for nearly two decades before their relationship took a romantic turn.140  
Steven and Mimi’s began a bi-coastal long-distance relationship in 
January 2010.141 In April 2010, Steven proposed to Mimi and set their 
wedding for September 4, 2010.142 Shortly after their engagement, at 
Steven’s behest, Mimi reluctantly saw her physician regarding a lump on 
her breast—a biopsy was later performed for further testing.143 Soon after 
her examination, Mimi received the devastating call from her physician that 
the sample “tested positive for an estrogen receptor-positive malignant 
tumor.”144 
Mimi underwent a lumpectomy on August 27, 2010, and married 
Steven a week later.145 Shortly after their honeymoon, the couple began 
“exploring IVF as a way to preserve their option of having a family given 
[Mimi’s] cancer diagnosis.”146 After several consults, the couple decided to 
go through with the IVF process.147 They signed two consent forms prior to 
the IVF procedure pursuant to California Health and Safety Code section 
125315.148 The couple indicated in their consent agreement that they 
choose to thaw and discard any unused embryos in the event the couple 
divorced.149 
On October 16, 2010, Mimi’s egg retrieval and Steven’s sperm sample 
transpired.150 Their doctor was able to retrieve eighteen eggs.151 “Of the 
[eighteen] eggs, only [twelve] were inseminated . . . and after three days, 
five embryos resulted.”152 The couple decided to wait a year to discuss the 
use of the embryos due to Mimi’s cancer treatment.153 The couple separated 
on August 5, 2013, and Steven filed for divorce on December 6, 2013.154 
Judge Anne-Christine Massullo ordered the embryos be thawed and 
destroyed pursuant to their agreement.155 The court found the agreement 
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was valid and enforceable.156 Judge Massullo declined to categorize the 
embryos as either “life” or “property,” stating that “they [the embryos] are, 
in the construct of the law, sui generis and will be deemed as such in this 
Statement of Decision.”157 Judge Massullo’s ruling is consistent with the 
California statutory scheme and the rationale in the seminal case, Davis v. 
Davis.158 Whether this statutory scheme benefits women is questionable.  
III. ANALYSIS 
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARIZONA REVISED STATUTE SECTION 25-
318.03 AND THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE 
Arizona Revised Statute section 25-318.03 was enacted to regulate the 
disposition of pre-embryos in divorce proceedings but in doing so, it is also 
a regulation on IVF. The statute presumes that we have a right to IVF and 
the product of the procedure. Does such a right exist?  
To analyze the constitutionality of the statute and the state’s power to 
enact such legislation we must begin by situating it within our current 
jurisprudence. It is unclear whether there is a fundamental right to use IVF.  
If such a right exists, many scholars suggest that it flows from a 
fundamental right to procreate.159 The right to procreate was first 
articulated in Skinner v. Oklahoma.160 The right to procreate was then 
placed within the privacy interest of the individual in Eisenstadt v. Baird.161 
In Eisenstadt the Court stated, “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it 
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”162 Meaning, the government 
may regulate the right to procreate, including IVF so long as there is a 
compelling state interest.  
Arizona Revised Statute section 25-318.03 should be held as 
unconstitutional as a matter of public policy because it indirectly imputes 
personhood and a right to life to a pre-embryo. The statute contains charged 
language that establishes a statutory scheme where the default disposition 
favors the party that will bring the embryo to life.163 This is an explicitly 
pro-life stance and the opposite of what most jurisdictions without a statue 
do. Courts tend to side with the party who will not bring the embryo to life 
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 159. See Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and 
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2008). 
 160. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 161. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S 438, 453 (1972). 
 162. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
 163. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (A) (1) (2018). 
ARIZONA GAMETE DONOR LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 1/22/2019  10:19 AM 
136 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:1] 
because doing so forces parenthood on the objecting party.164 However, this 
approach may be incorrect because of a misinterpretation of abortion 
jurisprudence.165 
In the landmark decision, Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that 
states have a compelling interest in embryos at viability or, in other words, 
the moment that the fetus is capable of a meaningful life outside the 
mother’s womb.166 For pre-embryos, this would technically be the moment 
of fertilization. However, this analysis is not applicable here because Roe 
hinged on bodily integrity, and pre-embryos do not intrude on women’s 
bodily integrity in the same way as pregnancy because they are still outside 
of the body and gestation has not occurred.167 In a situation in which the 
woman does not want to take actions to bring the embryo to life and her 
former spouse will, then under Arizona’s statutory scheme, he would be 
awarded the embryo and her bodily integrity allegedly will not be infringed 
on because she will not gestate the embryo. However, it is important to 
note that in order to create the pre-embryo, the female gamete provider’s 
bodily integrity is compromised at each stage of the IVF procedure. This 
statute also absolves the party who is not awarded the embryo of legal 
responsibility to parent and provide support. Thus, it is likely that this 
statute would be found constitutional under current jurisprudence because it 
does not force implantation or gestation on the woman. 
Harvard Law Professor I. Glen Cohen argues that the Constitution does 
not provide a right not to procreate.168 Through an analysis of Supreme 
Court precedent, Cohen describes the right to procreate as “containing three 
possible sticks: the right not to be a genetic parent, the right not to be a 
legal parent, and the right not to be a gestational parent (because at present 
only women can carry a fetus, this last right is limited to women).”169 
Cohen argues that Supreme Court jurisprudence protecting your right not to 
be a gestational parent does not “compel a fundamental right to be a genetic 
parent.”170 The right not to be a genetic parent can be waived in advance by 
consent to engage in sexual activity or contract.171 
Cohen recognizes that your right not to be a gestational parent and your 
right not to be a genetic parent may be in conflict with each other.172 To 
that end, Cohen suggests that a rule for resolving conflict between rights 
would establish the following: “1) protect the interests of potential life after 
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viability; 2) protect the right to be or not to be a gestational parent, because 
of its close tie to bodily integrity;[and] 3) protect the right not to be a 
genetic parent.”173 Under Cohen’s framework, a statute like Arizona’s is 
constitutional and preferred because it resolves the tension between the 
right not to be a gestational parent and the right to not be a genetic parent. 
A woman is not compelled to be a gestational parent if she does not want 
and her bodily integrity is preserved. Her consent in the procedure waives 
her right not to be a genetic parent.  
I take issue with this position because it places men and women as 
equal donors with the same interest in the embryo.174 In doing so, this 
position minimizes the bodily intrusion on women’s bodies during the 
different stages of the IFV procedure by calling it a waiver of the right to 
be a genetic parent. In other words, consent for the procedure allows the 
other party to lay claim to the embryo. 
B. RECOGNIZING WOMEN’S VALUE AND GREATER PROPERTY INTEREST IN 
FROZEN EMBRYOS 
I argue that courts should shift to a woman-centered approach when 
adjudicating embryo disputes, even if there is a contract. What I mean by a 
woman-centered approach is that women should presumptively be awarded 
any embryos in most, if not all, divorce or separation proceeding for two 
main reasons: 1) under a property framework, women have greater 
ownership rights to a fertilized embryo than do men because of their 
biology, or put differently, their reproductive capacity and 2) there is no 
legal right not to procreate.175 
To hold that both spouses who provide their gametes are equal donors 
ignores biological realities and is simply a falsity. From a biological 
standpoint, men and women are different. Women are born with all of the 
eggs that they will have for the rest of their lives.176 In fact, once women 
reach sexual maturity, they lose at least one egg every month during 
menstruation.177 When women reach menopause, which is generally around 
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the age of fifty-one, their eggs are no longer viable, and their reproductive 
potential has come to an end.178 In contrast, a fertile man may reproduce 
well past the age of any woman. Some studies suggest that a man’s 
biological clock might be more similar to women’s than previously thought 
and that with increasing age men too risk infertility.179 While this may be 
true, this does not change my analysis because sperm are created 
constantly, and it is possible for men to obtain a new donor egg. For 
women, each egg released during menstruation or extracted for IVF is an 
egg that the woman can never recover—it is gone forever.  
Furthermore, biological difference is reflected in the marketplace for 
donors. In the U.S. an egg donation can cost an average of $25,000, 
depending on the number of eggs purchased.180 However, vials of donor 
sperm cost anywhere from $400 to $650 depending on location, type of 
insemination and anonymity of donor.181 Moreover, the number of eggs 
that are produced during one round of IVF is vastly smaller than that of 
sperm. The average male ejaculate contains twenty million sperm.182 One 
round of IVF can yield fifteen to twenty eggs depending on the health and 
age of the woman.183 
Biological difference is also represented in the IVF procedure itself—it 
is far more physically taxing on a women’s body than it is on a man’s 
body. Women’s bodies are repeatedly invaded throughout the IVF process. 
For example, the IVF process begins with women taking fertility 
medications, causing hormonal and physical changes to the body.184 The 
woman must then undergo ultrasounds to examine the ovaries, and blood 
tests to check hormone levels.185 Further bodily intrusion occurs during the 
extraction and implantation phases. Conversely, men merely supply their 
sperm sample by engaging in a routine act, self-stimulation. While the 
process is emotionally taxing on both parties, from a biological standpoint, 
the IVF process is different for men and women. Thus, the law should 
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recognize, women’s greater ownership rights to the embryo than men due 
to women’s unique reproductive capacity. 
Legal scholar Ruth Colker has argued that courts have a tendency to 
favor men’s interest in not having children in embryo dispute cases by 
equating their reproductive experiences in the IVF process.186 She uses 
Davis v. Davis to describe how Mary Sue Davis’ trauma and pain of having 
suffered five tubal pregnancies before turning to IVF and the six IVF 
attempts were only given cursory consideration.187 Colker argues that the 
court “imposed a notion of formal equality on a situation in which the 
parties were not in a formally equal position.”188 This argument still holds 
today and can be extended to both Ruby Torres’ pending case and Findley 
v. Lee.  
In Ruby’s case, at the trial level, the judge gave preference to her ex-
husband’s “right” not to have a child over Ruby’s physical investment in 
creating the embryos. She underwent the difficult IVF procedure one 
month before starting aggressive cancer treatment. Furthermore, these 
embryos are Ruby’s only opportunity at having biological children. These 
factors should have weighed heavily in her favor. The same analysis 
applies for cancer survivor Mimi Lee. Moving forward, the Arizona 
Revised Statute section 25-318.03 provides spouses in Ruby’s situation a 
better chance at being awarded the embryos. But that does little for women 
outside of Arizona. While I agree with the outcome, the pro-life policy and 
quasi-personhood status is troubling and problematic in other areas of 
reproductive rights, such as abortion. This is especially pertinent today 
given current American politics.  
Colker is not arguing that “the physical differences in reproductive 
capacity automatically mean that women’s claims trump men’s claims.”189 
She takes the position that the court should prefer life and “when a man 
does not want to sustain life, the woman has undergone painful and 
repeated IVF procedures, and has a lesser possibility of pregnancy in the 
future through IVF, there is even more reason to credit her desire to sustain 
life.”190 I do not completely agree with this position. If a woman does not 
want to bring the embryo to life and the husband does, her opinion should 
be weighed more heavily than his because of her greater property interest 
in the embryo and her reproductive capabilities. Women are born with only 
so many eggs, they should have more of a say of whether or not their 
gametes are used to bring life to a biological child absent an extreme 
circumstance. Meaning, in the event that the shoe is on the other foot, and 
the husband is the one who can no longer produce gametes and the 
 
 186. Colker, supra note 1, at 1071.  
 187. Id. at 1072. 
 188. Id. at 1073. 
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embryos are his only chance at progeny, this should be taken into 
consideration and perhaps weighed against the wife’s interest if her 
reproductive abilities allow for future progeny without the embryos. To be 
clear, I do not propose a pro-life approach, but instead advocate for an 
approach that considers an expansive view on reproductive freedom and 
choice.  
The most compelling counterargument to my proposal is that adopting 
a woman-centered approach is sex discrimination and punishes men for 
their biology, a status which is beyond their control. A woman-centered 
approach does not punish men for their biology but instead recognizes and 
attempts to mitigate the discrimination that women have historically 
encountered. Moreover, a woman-centered approach in the domain of new 
technology inches us toward sexual equality rather than perpetuating 
patriarchal notions of choice. Under the current legal landscape, it is 
women who are “out of luck” if they did not bargain for their embryo, 
which is simply not realistic in this context. This discriminatory effect may 
be exacerbated depending on the statutory scheme within her particular 
jurisdiction—if there is one at all. A woman’s centered approach to 
adjudicating pre-embryo disputes gives women a greater ownership stake 
in the embryo due to their proportional investment in its creation.  
Giving women more property rights to embryos does not perpetuate the 
sexist notion that women possess more responsibility for the care of 
children, it simply preserves a woman’s choice to have children. This 
decision rests not on a duty to be mother or a disproportionate 
responsibility for the care of children, but is instead contingent on her 
greater ownership stake in the property, the embryo, due to their large 
investment in its creation.  
C. PROPOSED FEDERAL RESOLUTION  
My proposed federal resolution is modest. At a minimum, a federal 
statute declaring frozen embryos as a special type of property should be 
enacted. This small change would bring about uniformity across states with 
regards to how courts proceed in the disposition of the case. Furthermore, it 
would strengthen other reproductive rights, such as abortion, because it 
would preempt states from enacting contrary legislation. Currently, 
outcomes concerning this reproductive rights issue hinge on the geographic 
location of the parties involved, and that should never be the case for such 
an important matter.  
While I recognize that frozen embryos have the potential for human 
life and it may feel repugnant to equate life with property, it may be a 
necessary evil to conceptualize embryos in this manner for a just and 
uniform outcome. To impute personhood on a frozen embryo is both 
incorrect and problematic.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
IVF is a practice that allows many people who otherwise would not be 
able to conceive an opportunity to beget their own progeny. Whether or not 
we have a constitutional right to this technology is ambiguous. Further 
complicating matters is the legal status of pre-embryos—person, property, 
or something in-between? Currently, the key factor in determining the legal 
status of a pre-embryo largely depends on geographical location. In legal 
practice, the status of pre-embryos is closer to property than a person. In 
contrast, the medical and scientific fields provide some semblance of 
clarity, pre-embryos are closer to personhood than property. To those who 
go through the IVF process or are considering doing so, the pre-embryos 
represent many things, such as hope, flexibility in family planning, and the 
possibility of a child. While there are compelling reasons to grant pre-
embryos personhood, as cold as it may seem, granting this status could be 
dangerous to other reproductive rights, namely abortion.  
In divorce proceedings where the disposition of pre-embryos is 
contested, women should presumptively win all embryo disputes because 
their unique reproductive capacity makes it so that they have greater 
ownership rights to a fertilized embryo than do men. Biological difference 
is relevant at every stage of the IVF process. Women literally lose a piece 
of their body they will never get back and they must undergo a surgical 
procedure to have it removed. I am not arguing that men’s contributions are 
without value, but rather, that they are not equivalent. To equate men’s 
contribution to women’s in the context of IVF demeans the physical 
intrusions and pain women endure, disadvantages women, and is 
detrimental to women’s reproductive rights issues.  
Jurisdictions that apply a balancing test where they weigh women’s 
contributions to the embryo the same as men’s, as seen in the seminal case 
Davis v. Davis, strengthen the patriarchal hold (white) men have always 
had in society. This framework gives the husband an alleged right to not 
procreate over the wife’s right to procreate and, in doing so, gives men 
more decision-making power in these disputes. Moreover, the newly 
promulgated Arizona Revised Statute section 25-318.03 yields a favorable 
result for women, assuming that women are the ones who 
disproportionately want to bring the pre-embryo to life. However, the 
phrasing of the bill and its pro-life origins are problematic because they 
impute personhood on a cluster of cells that may never become a person. 
This is a dangerous trend to set because it has far reaching potential in 
other areas of reproductive rights.  
Using a hybrid property and contract approach, as is done in California, 
may seem equitable and impartial because parties negotiate the terms and 
know what to expect in the event of divorce. However, it is problematic 
because the emotional subject matter—contracting the disposition of 
hypothetical children with a partner that one loves and believes they will 
be with them until death do them part—stifles any inclination to negotiate 
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equitable terms and choose directives that will prevent a worst-case 
scenario for both parties. Even highly educated people, like Mimi Lee and 
Ruby Torres, were not immune to making this mistake.  
It is well-documented that women end up in a worse economic 
situation after divorce than men do.191 Upholding contracts or incorrectly 
applying a balance of interest tests and constitutional misinterpretations 
leave women reproductively “poorer” after divorce. If we don’t change our 




 191. Colker, supra note 1, at 1063 (arguing that women are “reproductively ‘poorer’ 
than men following divorce if the couple has attempted to use IVF during the marriage”). 
